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1. Introduction
In this paper we develop a Ricardian trade model that features technology
transfer via foreign direct investment (FDI). FDI is traditionally regarded as an organic
amalgamation of capital, technology, and management. With the increasing integration
of the global capital market and the development of domestic capital markets in many
host countries of multinational enterprises (MNEs), capital movement from the home
countries of MNEs to the host countries seems to have become the least important
ingredient of FDI.
1  In contrast, technology and managerial talent have increasingly
become the key ingredients of FDI (see e.g. Root (1994, 591)).
2  In light of these facts,
we regard FDI as synonymous to technology  (and managerial skill) transfer.
There is a substantial literature on international trade and MNEs, and a recent
survey of the literature is given by Markusen (1995).  Among others, Helpman (1984)
and Markusen (1984) incorporate MNEs into general equilibrium trade models based
on “headquarter services” that can be used to support both local plants and subsidiaries
set up abroad. On the one hand, production of headquarter services, which include
management, distribution, marketing, and product-specific R&D, enjoy economies of
scale. Thus MNEs have an incentive to concentrate their production in a single location.
On the other hand, international differences in factor endowments and technologies
provide an incentive to locate the production of final goods in countries with lower
costs. These researchers show that MNEs and FDI arise if the relative factor
endowments are sufficiently different across countries so that international trade alone
does not lead to factor price equalization.
3  Ethier (1986) also incorporates FDI into a
general equilibrium factor endowment trade mode. By emphasizing the internalization
decision of MNEs, he obtains results that are contrary to those of Markusen (1984) and
Helpman (1984): MNEs and FDI can arise when relative factor endowments are very
similar.  Moreover, FDI may either substitute or complement trade.
More recently, Brainard (1993) and Horstmann and Markusen (1992) develop
models that feature two-way FDI.  They find that MNEs are more likely to arise when
firm-level fixed costs (like R&D) are large, tariffs or transportation costs are high,
plant-level scale economies are not large, countries are large, and countries are similar
in relative factor endowments (this last result is obtained in Brainard (1993) only).
Most recently, Baldwin and Ottaviano (1998) propose a model of multi-product MNEs2
that simultaneously engage in intra-industry trade and intra-industry FDI.
Influenced by the large descriptive literature on MNEs and the empirical studies
of the industry characteristics and geographical location of MNEs, as in Caves (1982),
all existing theoretical studies in the literature of international trade and MNEs focus on
the case where MNEs arise from imperfectly competitive markets as a result of
increasing returns to scale or product differentiation. In contrast, our model is based on
perfect competition in the product markets with neither transportation costs nor trade
barriers.
4  Technology transfer via FDI (due to technologyical differences between
countries and the need to spend resources to effect technology transfer) can occur even
in the absence of imperfect competition in the product markets. In the presence of
increasing cost of technology transfer at the level of the entire economy, firms in one
country having superior technology may co-exist with firms in another country with
inferior technology. Unlike the above-mentioned studies, we employ the Ricardian
trade model that allows international differences in technologies rather than the
Heckscher-Ohlin trade model that features international difference in factor
endowments.
Our theoretical framework allows us to examine issues that are different from
those studied by other researchers.  Instead of explaining two-way trade and FDI among
developed countries, our model is intended to complement the existing literature by
explaining FDI made by firms from technologically more advanced economies in
technologically less advanced economies.
In Section 2, after recapitulating a simple two-region (North and South) two-
good Ricardian trade model, we augment it by allowing for international
technology/management transfer that requires the use of resources. We examine in
Section 3 different possibilities of technology transfer under the assumption that the
South is small, and do so in Section 4 under the assumption that the South is large.  In
Section 5 we extend the two-good model to the case of infinitely many goods.  The
final section summarizes our findings and indicates directions for future research.
2. A Two-Region, Two-Good Ricardian Model with Technology Transfer
and FDI
As in the standard Ricardian model, there are two regions (N for “North” and S
for “South”), two goods (f for “food” and m for “manufactures”), and there is only one3
factor of production (“labor”) in each region. The supply of labor in S and N is fixed at
L and L
* , respectively. Labor is internationally immobile but goods are freely traded in
the absence of any transportation costs.  It is well known that FDI may arise in response
to trade barriers and transportation costs, but in our model we assume away these two
motives for FDI.
S’s production technology for food and manufactures is described by two unit
labor requirements, af and am, respectively. Similarly, N’s unit labor requirements are
given by af
* and am
*.  Without loss of generality, we suppose that S has a comparative
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Thus, S exports food and N exports manufactures in the absence of technology transfer.
Three possible configurations of technological differences are consistent with the
direction of comparative advantage as described by inequality (1), namely,
(a) af < af
* , and am > am
*,           (2a)
(b) af > af
*, and am > am
*,           (2b)
(c) af < af
*, and am
 < am
*.           (2c)
The inequalities in (2a)-(2c) describe the two regions’ absolute advantages or
disadvantages in production technology. In the case of (2a), S has both comparative and
absolute advantage in the production of food while N has both comparative and
absolute advantage in the production of manufactures. In the case of (2b), S has a
comparative advantage in food but an absolute disadvantage in both goods; in the case
of (2c), N has a comparative advantage in manufactures but absolute disadvantage in
both goods. In these last two cases, one region is unambiguously more advanced than
the other in production technology, and international direct investment by MNEs will
emerge if the cost of technology transfer is small relative to the technology gaps. Given
our interest in analyzing technology transfer from an advanced region to a backward
region, we shall ignore (2a). Since cases (2b) and (2c) are symmetric, we shall focus on
the case of (2b) alone, i.e., the case in which N has an absolute advantage in both goods.
That is, N is technologically advanced whereas S is technologically backward.
It has long been recognized that FDI by MNEs is by far the most important
channel of technology transfer from advanced economies to developing economies
(e.g., Quinn (1969), Stewart and Nihei (1987, 8-12)).  Many researchers of MNEs have4
emphasized the importance of training managers, workers and engineers of the
technology recipients (e.g., Quinn (1969), Hieneman et.al. (1985), Stewart and Nihei
(1987, 10-12, 74-75), Sakakibara and Westney (1992) and Root (1994, 590)).  Teece
(1976, 36-37 and 44) and Mansfield et.al. (1982, 69-71) identified four groups of
transfer costs, and those costs all involve technical and operational personnel training.
5
They found the average transfer costs to be 19 percentage of total project costs and were
far from trivial.
As trainers as well as managers, expatriate employees of MNEs play a crucial
role in the process of technology transfer, even though their number is small in relative
terms.
6 They are relatively more expensive and limited in supply, and are often
supplemented by the nationals of the host economies who are educated in the advanced
economies (e.g., Hieneman et.al. (1985), Stewart and Nihei (1987, 74) and Duning
(1993, 373)).
Based on the empirical facts about technology transfer by MNEs and consistent
with the transaction costs theory of technology transfer (see Markusen (1995)), we
assume that MNEs are the only vehicle of technology transfer between S and N and that
technology transfer requires the use of resources.  The amount of resources required
depends on the abilities of the MNEs, which in turn depend on the availability of
expatriate managers and technicians who possess the knowledge needed in managing a
foreign subsidiary and in adopting advanced production technology in the backward
region.  We assume that there is a continuum of MNEs with decreasing efficiency in
technology transfer and each MNE can manage an increasing volume of foreign
production only at increasing cost.  Under these two assumptions, the resource
requirements of the marginal MNE goes up as the total amount of MNE production
increases.
7  That is to say, the “supply curve of technology transfer” is upward sloping.
In our following analysis, we shall assume this upward supply curve to be linear.  As
we shall see, while the marginal MNE just breaks even from technology transfer, the
intra-MNEs earn quasi-rents.
Workers in S  and  N are assumed to be equally productive given the same
production technology. For every unit of food produced by a marginal MNE, it uses af
*
unit of S labor for production and a certain amount of S labor in the process of
technology transfer.
8  The latter amount is industry-specific but also depends on the
total amount of technology transfer carried out by the MNEs.  Specifically, the amount5
of S labor required for technology transfer per unit of food produced by an MNE is
given by rkfaf
*, is where kf is fixed and captures the characteristics of technology transfer
specific to food, whereas r depends on the total amount of technology transfer by all
MNEs in both industries.
As a result, the unit production cost measured in terms of S labor, our
numeraire, incurred by the marginal MNE in food production is af
* (1 + rkf).  The unit
cost of production of food using the backward technology is af.  Thus, FDI  takes place
in S’s food industry if in equilibrium
f f f a rk a < + ) 1 (
*      (3)
and local firms using the backward technology af will survive only if the weak
inequality in (3) is reversed.
Similarly, FDI takes place in S’s manufacture industry if
m m m a rk a < + ) 1 (
* (4)
and local firms using the backward technology am will survive only if the weak
inequality in (4) is reversed.
To operationalize the assumption that r depends on the amount of technology
transfer, let T = a
*
f kf qMf +a
*
m km qMm be the volume of technology transfer, where qMf
and qMm are the MNE output of food and manufactures, respectively, in the South. For
simplicity, suppose the relationship between T and r is given by
r = t0 + cT (5)
where both t0 and c are positive coefficients. For analytical purposes, we may think of
(5) as the “inverse supply curve” of T.  From (5) we can obtain the “direct supply
curve” of T,
T =  (r – t0)/c (5’)
An upward sloping supply curve of T captures the probable phenomenon that
when MNEs expand their operations in foreign countries they may have to tap marginal
resources that are increasingly less efficient at technology transfer. An improvement in
knowledge about foreign countries would shift T’s supply curve outward or downward.
Whether technology transfer occurs in only one or both of the industries
depends on absolute technological differences as captured by af, af
*, am, and am
*, the
resource cost of technology transfer as captured by kf, k m, and the variable r that can
analytically be thought of as the unit cost of T for the marginal MNE.6
On the demand side, let us assume that the preferences of all consumers in the
world are described by a Cobb-Douglas utility function U = Cf Cm, where Cf and Cm are
the consumption of food and manufactures, respectively. Given this utility function,
each consumer will divide his total expenditure equally between food and
manufactures.  If y is a region’s GNP measured in food and p is the relative price of
manufactures, then its welfare is given by y
2/(4p)  or any positive monotonic
transformation of the expression.
In the next two sections we shall first study the case where S produces either
food or manufactures, and then study the case where S produces both goods.  In the first
case technology transfer occurs in only one industry, while in the second case
technology transfer occurs in one or both of the industries.
3. The South Produces Only One Good
3.1       The South Is Small
If S is small relative to N, then the equilibrium relative price p is determined by
N’s unit production costs of food and manufactures, i.e., p = am
*/ af
*.  Which good the
small  S will specialize in depends on its comparative advantage after technology
transfer.
3.1.1    The South Specializes in Food
Given the initial pattern of comparative advantage as described by (1), S will
continue to specialize in food if technology transfer occurs in food but not in
manufactures.  A sufficient condition for this pattern of  technology transfer is
(Af - 1) > kf t0  but (Am - 1) < km t0 (6)










*  are measures of the technological gaps between S and N,
and  t0 is the value of r of the MNE that is most efficient at technology transfer.
Condition (6) says that at the minimum r, technology transfer to food is profitable but
that to manufactures is not.
Referring to the discussion preceding (3), we see that in producing a unit of
food, all MNEs in S use af
* of local labor in direct production.  The unit cost of
technology transfer varies from t0 to r.  Thus, the marginal unit cost of technology
transfer, rkfaf
*, exceeds the average unit cost (r+t0)kfaf
*/2, where both costs are measured7
in terms of S labor.
9
Let qMf  be the quantity of food produced by all the MNEs in S.  Then
T = af
*kf qMf,( 7 )
and the total amount of S labor employed by the MNEs, including labor employed
































Equation (9) shows that LM is an increasing and convex function of T  or r , where
convexity follows from a positive relationship between r and T in (5).
The equilibrium value of r and T depends on the relationship between LM and S’s
total supply of labor L, as described in Figure 1. If the “supply of T is small” relative to
the supply of labor in S (such as L2), the constraint  LL M <  is not binding.  In this case
the equilibrium configuration is given by () , ) ( , , T L T r M  where T  is determined by (5’)
and (9). If in contrast the supply of T is large relative to the supply of labor in S (such as
L1), the constraint  LL M <  is binding.  The corresponding equilibrium configuration is
given by (r1, T1, L1).
Using (5’) in (9), we can distinguish two alternative cases.  If
, ) 2 /( ] ) 1 ( [
2 2
0
2 L ck k t A f f f < + −  then the constraint  L LM < is not binding.  We refer to it
as a case in which “the supply of T is small”.  If  , ) 2 /( ] ) 1 ( [
2 2
0
2 L ck k t A f f f > + −  then
the constraint is binding.  We refer to it as a case in which “the supply of T is large”.
The Supply of T is Small
If the supply of T is small relative to L, then r=(Af -1)/kf   and  () f f f rk a a + = 1
* ,
i.e., local firms co-exist with MNEs in S’s food industry.  S’s GNP is given by L/af, but
its GDP is given by the sum of its GNP and the quasi-rents of the MNEs, also measured
in food.  In other words, the small S region gains nothing from technology transfer and
all the gains accrue to the MNEs.8
The MNEs’ quasi-rents are equal to the difference between their total output of
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= π is the “producer surplus” above the supply
curve of T but below r.  Not surprisingly, we can obtain the quasi-rents of all of the
MNEs directly from the producer surplus associated with T’s supply curve.  This
relationship will be used repeatedly in the subsequent analyses.  In particular, a decrease
in Af, an increase in kf, an increase in c, and an increase in t0 will reduce π M by reducing





 is an increasing function of T after the
positive relationship between r and T is taken into account, and the equilibrium T is a
decreasing function of t0 and c.  Thus, the MNEs’ quasi-rents measured in food go up
(down) as the supply curve of T shifts outward (inwards).
The Supply of T is Large
If the supply of T is large relative to L, then  () f f f rk a a + > 1
* , no local firms
will survive, and LM = L. Unlike the case in which the supply of T is small, S’s GNP
measured in food increases as t0 and c decrease.  Clearly, S’s welfare is higher with than
without technology transfer if the supply of T is sufficiently large.
If we assume that all of the MNEs’ quasi-rents are spent in N, then S’s export of
food is equal to half of S’s GNP plus the entire quasi-rents, i.e.,
[] . ) 1 ( /
2
*







 + = π  Moreover, the exports associated with quasi-rents
represent trade in services.
An outward shift of the supply curve of T results in a lower r and a larger T,
leading to an increase in S’s GNP as well as the MNEs’ quasi-rents and consequently an9
increase in ESf.  N’s welfare goes up because its GNP is higher and the terms of trade
remain unchanged.
The above results are summarized as
Proposition 1: Technology transfer via MNEs increases world output.  If the South is
small,  then it gains from technology transfer in the food industry only
if the supply of T is sufficiently large. The North always gains from
technology transfer.  An increase in the supply of T leads to a larger
volume of trade in goods and services.
3.1.2.   The South Specializes in Manufactures
An interesting consequence of technology transfer is that it may lead to a
reversal in the direction of comparative advantage.  For the South to specialize in
manufactures, which is opposite to that described by (1), two conditions must hold
(Am -1)/km > (Af -1)/kf, and          (11)
1 + rkm < Af                            (12)
Condition (11) is necessary because otherwise technology transfer occurs in
food, thus reinforcing the initial pattern of comparative advantage, which is the case
studied in Section 3.1.1.  Given condition (11), condition (12) is both necessary and
sufficient for the initial pattern of comparative advantage to be reversed.  It implies that
the supply of T is sufficiently abundant for r to be sufficiently small (a sufficient
condition is 1+ t0km<<Af and c is sufficiently close to zero).  Under these conditions no
local firms survive in the manufactures industry.
As in the previous case, N gains from the quasi-rents.  But how about S?
Proposition 2: If the South is small and if its direction of comparative advantage is
reversed due to technology transfer, then its welfare is higher with than
without technology transfer.  The North gains from technology transfer
due to the presence of quasi-rents.  An increase in the supply of T leads
to a larger volume of trade.
Proof: S’s GNP without technology transfer is equal to L/af, whereas its GNP with
technology transfer is equal to  () [ ]( )
* * * / 1 / f m m m a a a rk L + , where aa mf
** /  is the
relative price of manufactures.  In light of (12), S’s GNP and welfare are higher
with technology transfer. S’s export of manufactures is equal to10
[] ) 1 ( /
2
*







 + = π , which increases as the supply of T increases. S
must be better off when it chooses to specialize in manufactures because it
always has the option of specializing in food.
3.2.      Neither Region Is Large
When neither region is large, each will specialize in the production of one good
and the equilibrium relative price depends on the regions’ supply and demand. As in the
previous sections, S will export one-half of its GNP in exchange for imports and the
entire quasi-rents to repatriate the quasi-rents to N.  In the following we shall focus on
the equilibrium terms of trade and welfare; the behavior of trade volume is similar to
that stated in Propositions 1 and 2.
3.2.1.   The South Specializes in Food while the North Specializes in Manufactures
If the supply of T is small relative to L, then local firms co-exist with MNEs in
S’s food industry.  S’s GNP is given by L/af, and N’s GNP is equal to
() Lp a a mM f
** // + π .  Using the balanced trade condition, we derive the equilibrium











. In the absence of technology transfer,
() pa La L m f =
** / because π M = 0. Upon comparison, we see that N’s welfare improves
with technology transfer due to an increase in its GNP and an improvement in its terms
of trade. But S’s welfare declines due to a deterioration of its terms of  trade.
10
If the supply of T is large relative to L, then only MNEs produce food in S,
whose GNP is equal to  [ ] ) 1 ( /
*
f f rk a L + .  The equilibrium relative price of manufactures













. As revealed in this expression, N’s terms of trade
improve due to two reasons: (i) the unit cost of producing food in S goes down and (ii)
an increase in demand for manufactures arising from the MNE profits.
S’s welfare with technology transfer may be higher or lower than that without
technology transfer because it gains from an increase in productivity but loses due to
deterioration in its terms of trade.  If the supply of T is sufficiently abundant, then r and11
π M become very small.  In that case S’s welfare will be higher with technology transfer.
To sum up, we obtain
Proposition 3: If the supply of T is small, the South’s welfare declines in the presence
of technology transfer due to a deterioration in its terms of trade. If T is
large, the South’s welfare may improve if its gain in productivity is
sufficiently large. The North’s welfare improves unambiguously
regardless of  the supply of T.
3.2.2.   South Specializes in Manufactures while North Specializes in Food
As in Section 3.1.2, to have a reversal in the pattern of comparative advantage,











, which is rather different from that without technology transfer,
namely,  () pa La L m f =
** / . Under this pattern of specialization, S’s GNP is given by
() [ ] m m rk a Lp + 1 /
* .  By comparing S’s indirect utility with technology transfer and that
without technology transfer, it can be shown that the former exceeds the latter if and
only if
() () m M f rk L LA + + > 1 π           (13)
If π M did not appear in (13), then the condition is met because of (12).  However,
the presence of π M may make the inequality go in the opposite direction.  From the
expression of p, one sees that π M worsens S’s terms of trade.  Nevertheless, if a f
*  is
sufficiently smaller than af (so that Af is large) and that the supply of T is sufficiently
large and elastic (so that r and π M are small), S’s welfare will be higher with than
without technology transfer.  That is to say, when S is not a small region,  Proposition 2
holds only under somewhat more stringent conditions.
4. The South Produces Both Goods
If  S is large relative to N, it produces both goods and its unit costs after
technology transfer determine the relative price p.  The volume of trade is equal to one-
half of N’s GNP less the entire quasi-rents of MNEs, but the pattern of trade depends on
N’s comparative advantage after technology transfer.
11  Depending on the size of12
technological gaps (Af and Am) and the parameters of technology transfer (kf, km and r),
technology transfer may occur in the food industry only, or in the manufactures
industry only, or in both industries. More specifically, if
(Af -1)/ kf >t0> (Am -1)/km,
then there is technology transfer in the food industry alone.  If these strict inequalities
are reversed, then there is technology transfer in the manufactures industry alone.  For
technology transfer to occur in both industries, it requires that
t0<(A-1)/k≡  min{(Af -1)/ kf, (Am -1)/km} and
c is sufficiently small so that  . / ) 1 ( k A r − <
In our analysis of these three cases below, we focus on S and N’s welfare but
omit the effect on p and the volume of trade.
4.1.      Technology Transfer to the Food Industry Only
N will specialize in manufactures. The relative price of manufactures is equal to
am/af, same as that without technology transfer if the supply of T is small, but is equal to
[ ] ) 1 ( /
*
f f m rk a a +  if the supply of T is large.  In the first case, S’s welfare is unaffected
by technology transfer but N’s welfare improves unambiguously due to quasi-rents. In
the second case, S’s welfare improves because its gain in productivity dominates the
deterioration in its terms of trade, while N’s welfare increases further from an
improvement in its terms of trade. That is to say, Proposition 1 is generalizable to the
case of a large Southern region.
4.2.      Technology Transfer to the Manufacture Industry Only
4.2.1.   Technology Transfer Does Not Affect the Direction of Comparative Advantage
Unlike Section 3.1.2, the effect of technology transfer to manufactures depends
on the supply of T. If the supply of T is small, the relative price of manufactures is
unaffected by technology transfer.  S’s welfare remains the same but N’s welfare
increases. If the supply of T is large, then no local firms exist in S’s manufacturing
industry and the relative price of manufactures becomes  () f m m a rk a / 1
* + . S’s welfare
improves because its productivity increases and its terms of trade improve.  The effect
of technology transfer on N’s welfare, however, is ambiguous because N gains from
quasi-rents but loses from a deterioration in its terms of trade, something that cannot13
happen if N is large.
4.2.2.   Technology Transfer Reverses the Direction of Comparative Advantage
This case arises if the supply of T is large and condition (12) is satisfied. S’s
welfare improves despite a deterioration in its terms of trade, but N’s welfare may go up
or down because the welfare derived from its GDP from producing food under
technology transfer may be larger or smaller than from producing manufactures without
technology transfer.  Nevertheless, N’s welfare is unambiguously higher with
technology transfer if Af >Am (i.e., a f
*  is sufficiently small relative to af).
4.3.      Technology Transfer to Both Industries















at most one of (3) and (4) may hold as equality.
12  The “demand curve for T” – the
maximum r that permits different levels of technology transfer to occur - is depicted in
Figure 2 under the condition that [(Af -1)/kf]>[(Am-1)/km].  If the inequality is reversed,
then the relative position of (Af -1)/kf and (Am-1)/km is also reversed.
For technology transfer to occur in both industries, the supply of T must be
sufficiently large to intersect the demand curve at points such as A and B.  At A MNEs
dominate the food industry whereas in the manufacture industry they co-exist with local
firms. At B there are no local firms in either industry in S, implying that both (3) and (4)
hold with strict inequality.
It can be shown that the pattern of comparative advantage depends on the
relative magnitudes of kf and km.  If kf < km, then N specializes in manufactures; if kf > km,
then N specializes in food.  It is intuitive that N has a comparative advantage in a
production technology that is more difficult to transfer to S.
It can be shown that S’s welfare is higher with than without technology transfer,
regardless of whether the point of intersection is A or B. For a large S, its welfare
depends on its own production frontier, regardless of the pattern of trade.  And the
frontier is pushed out unambiguously due to technology transfer.
If  kf < km, N specializes in manufactures but if kf > km, it specializes in food.
However, the effect of technology transfer on N’s welfare is in general ambiguous.14
Proposition 4: Suppose the South is large, the North is small, and technology transfer
occurs in both industries. The South’s welfare improves with technology
transfer regardless of the direction of comparative advantage. The
North’s comparative advantage in manufactures remains intact if and
only if km>kf,  but the direction of comparative advantage is reversed if
km<kf.  The North’s welfare depends on the direction of comparative
advantage as well as the differences between the terms of trade with and
without technology transfer.
5. Technology Transfer in the Continuum Ricardian Model
In this section we extend the above analysis to the continuum Ricardian model
developed by Dornbusch, Fisher, and Samuelson (1977) (hereafter DFS) in order to
explore the question of technology transfer via FDI when there are many industries.
Following DFS, let a(z) be the amount of S labor, and a
*(z) the amount of N labor that is
needed to produce one unit of good z, where z lies within the unit interval, i.e., 0< z < 1.
Let A(z) be the ratio of a(z) and a
*(z).
13  With appropriate indexing of the goods, A(z)
can be made a monotonic function of z, and without loss of generality let us suppose
that  S's comparative advantage in good z decreases as z increases, i.e., A(z) is an
increasing function of z.  Given this indexing convention  z may be loosely interpreted
as the level of technological sophistication.  In addition, by choosing an appropriate unit
of measurement for each good, we can also make a
*(z) increasing in z.
As in the two-good model, N is assumed to be superior to S in the production
technology of all goods, i.e., a
*(z) < a(z) for all z. The Northern firms' technological
edge over the Southern firms is measured by a(z) / a
*(z), which is just A(z), a
monotonically increasing function.  Thus, A(z) measures the relative benefits from
technology transfer. As before, the cost of technology transfer, measured in S labor by
the marginal MNE, is given by ra
*(z)k(z).  We assume that the resource cost of
technology transfer is higher the more sophisticated is the product, i.e., k(z) is an
increasing function of z.
The counterpart of (3) and (4) is
[]. (z) a (z) k r 1 (z) a
* < +          (14)
As in the two-good model analyzed above, we assume that preferences of all15
consumers are identical and are represented by the continuum version of the Cobb-
Douglas utility function, i.e., each consumer will devote the same fraction of his income
to the consumption of each good z.
In the continuum model without technology transfer, it has been established by
DFS that under free trade and in the absence of transportation cost there exists~ z strictly
between 0 and 1 such that S produces all goods z demanded within the range [0,  ~ z ],
and N produces all goods z demanded within the range (~ z , 1].  That is, the “borderline”
good  ~ z  breaks the “chain of comparative advantage” A(z). The equilibrium wage of
Northern labor relative to Southern labor  ~ w, at which  ~ wa
*(~ z ) = a(~ z ), is determined
by the balanced trade condition.  This is to say, the continuum  model corresponds to
the two-good Ricardian model in Section 3.2 where neither region is relatively large.
In the presence of technology transfer, the “chain of comparative advantage” is
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As can be seen from (14), industry z’s maximum willingness to pay for T is given by
R(z) ≡  (A(z) –1)/k(z).  Since both A(z) and k(z) are increasing functions of z, the behavior
of R(z) is unclear without further restrictions.  We assume that R(z) is an increasing
function of z, or equivalently A(z) increases faster than k(z).  With the help of Figure 3,
it becomes clear that for any given w, there exists z0 and z1 such that S firms produce
goods in the range [0, z0], MNEs produce goods in [z0, z1], and N firms produce goods
in [z1, 1], where z0 and z1 satisfy
1 +rk(z0) = A(z0)
1 + rk(z1) = w.                      (16)
There two equations, together with the trade balance condition and the equality of
demand and supply of T, determine simultaneously the equilibrium (z0, z1,w ˆ , r).
To analyze these equilibrium conditions in more details, we first study the
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where D(z;r) is the total demand for good z at the price a
*(z)[1+rk(z)].  Since the16
world’s total income is yw = L + wL
* + π M,
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where π M = (r - t0)
2/2c.  From (16), for any fixed w, z0 is an increasing function of r but z1
is a decreasing function of r.  Thus, the integral in (20) is decreasing in r.  This
represents the price effect on demand.  Since π M increases with r, there is also an
“income effect” on the demand for T. So long as the direct effect dominates the indirect
effect, TD is a decreasing function of r. Even if TD is not a decreasing function of r, the
equilibrium r is still unique and stable so long as TD is steeper than the supply curve T
in the usual price-quantity space.   In any event, for any given w the equilibrium r is
determined by
TD = T,         (21)
where T is given by (5’).
The determination of equilibrium T is illustrated in Figure 4.  Given w, the
maximum willingness to pay for T is R(z1) whereas the minimum willingness to pay for
T is R(0).  The equilibrium r is  ) ( 0
* z R r =  and the equilibrium T is T
*.  An increase in
w, by increasing z1, will increase both 
* r  and T
*.
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The left-hand side represents demand for goods produced in N while the right-hand side
represents the supply of goods by N (i.e., N’s GDP).  There are two differences between
this equilibrium condition and that without technology transfer: (i) with technology
transfer w is given by [1 + rk(z1)] rather than by A() ~ z , and (ii) there are quasi-rents17
associated with technology transfer.
Thus, the equilibrium conditions are given by (16), (21) and (22). The situation
is illustrated in Figure 3.
14 The technologically least sophisticated goods within [0, z0]
are produced by local firms and those more sophisticated goods within [z0, z1] are
produced by MNEs in S. The most sophisticated goods within [z1,1] are produced in N
by Northern firms. The equilibrium w is given by [1+rk(z1)] rather than A(z1) because if
w>[1+rk(z1)] then it would be cheaper to produce the goods immediately to the right of
z1 in H by MNEs, contradicting the definition of z1.
Recall that R(z) is increasing in z.  Depending on the relationship between the
equilibrium r and R(z), we have three possibilities: (i)  ) 1 ( R r>  ; (ii)  ) 0 ( R r< , and (iii) rε
(R(0), R(1)).  In the first case, r is too high to result in any technology transfer, so it
degenerates into the original continuum model analyzed by DFS (1977).  In the second
case, r is so low that no local Southern firms survive in any industry.  We shall ignore
these two cases and instead focus on the third, general case in which Southern firms
exist in industries (0, z0) while MNEs operate in industries (z0,z1), where 1+rk(z0)=A(z0),
and w=1+rk(z1).
In this general case, N produces a narrower range of goods with technology
transfer, i.e., z1 >~ z . These goods would be produced by the technologically advanced
North in the absence of technology transfer, but are produced by the backward South as
a result of technology transfer. In a sense, technology transfer has generated a “product
cycle” for goods within [~ z,  z 1].  It can be seen from Figure 3 that a decrease in r over
time increases the range of goods produced by MNEs.  In other words, if the supply
curve of T falls over time, then the product cycle applies to increasingly more
sophisticated products over time.
Even though our model is static, it generates product cycles by way of
technology transfer via MNEs.  Thus, it is in the same spirit as Vernon (1966), but is
different from the dynamic models that generate product cycles from the South’s
imitation of Northern innovations (e.g., Grossman and Helpman (1991a, 1991b)).
Even though z1>~ z , the relative wage of Northern labor does not necessarily go
up.  As can be seen in Figure 3, this result arises because without technology transfer w
= A(~ z ) but with technology transfer w = [1+rk(z1)], where A(z) > [1+rk(z)] for all z
that is produced by N firms and MNEs.18
The position of z1 or w is determined by the balanced trade condition, but the
presence of π M makes the determination complicated. To illustrate our analysis, we
consider a special case of the supply curve of T, namely, the supply curve is infinitely
elastic.  The case is analyzed in the Appendix, but the results can be summarized as
Preposition 5: Suppose that the supply of T is infinitely elastic at t0 (i.e., all MNEs
are equally efficient in technology transfer). Then in equilibrium
technology transfer takes place via FDI if and only if t0<R(~ z ).
Furthermore, ~ z < z1,w ~ >w and a decline in t0 raises z1 but lowers w.
Note that when the supply of T is infinitely elastic, there are no quasi-rents
associated with technology transfer.  An upward sloping supply curve will result in
quasi-rents and higher welfare for N directly via additional GNP and indirectly via the
terms of trade effect.  This more general case is analyzed in the Appendix.  It is shown
there that an increase in the supply of T will raise z1 unambiguously.  If the system is
stable, then r will decline.
 Using S labor as the numeraire, we see from Figure 3 that the prices of all
goods produced by MNEs are lower. The prices of goods produced in N are higher or
lower than in the absence of technology transfer, depending on whether w has risen or
fallen, respectively.  As in the two-good Ricardian model analyzed in Section 3.2.1,
where neither N nor S is relatively large, Southern labor gains from the presence of
MNEs due to productivity gains, but may also lose due to a deterioration in its terms of
trade.  In the event that the supply curve of T is perfectly elastic, S’s terms of trade
improve because w declines.  Northern labor gains from the technology transfer unless
N’s terms of trade deteriorate substantially relative to the lower prices of goods made by
MNEs. In addition, N’s total welfare also increases due to quasi-rents, which represent
trade in services.
As in the two-good model, technology transfer in the continuum model expands
the world’s production frontier.  Thus, at the prices under technology transfer, world
output must be higher with than without transfer.
What about the volume of trade measured in terms of Southern labor?  In
equilibrium the South imports a fraction L/(L+wL
*+π M) of all of the goods produced in
the North, whose total value is wL
*.  The South exports enough goods in [0, z1] not only
to pay for this import, but also to repatriate π M to the North.  By definition, the total
trade in goods and services between N and S is equal to19
[LL
*w/(L+wL
*+π M)]+ π M.
The effect of technology transfer via MNEs on world trade in goods and services is
through its impact on w and π M.  In the likely case that w falls but π M rises with an
increase in the supply of T, the effect on total trade measured in Southern labor is
ambiguous.  If the supply of T is perfectly elastic, then π M = 0 and the volume of trade
must decline as w decreases.
Since the real wage of Southern labor increases due to technology transfer, a
decline in world trade measured in Southern labor is not inconsistent with an increase
in world trade measured in terms of products or utility.  Nevertheless, if technology
transfer is increasingly free, then in the limit there will be no technological differences
and zero trade.
6. Summary and Directions for Future Research
We have extended the traditional and continuum Ricardian models to feature
both international trade and technology transfer via FDI by MNEs.  Among others, we
have shown that (a) world output increases in the presence of technology transfer by
MNEs; (b) technology transfer may reverse the direction of comparative advantage; (c)
the host country of the MNEs may gain or lose depending on the relative importance of
productivity increases brought about by the MNEs and the deterioration of the host
country’s terms of trade, and (d) trade in goods and services are positively related to
FDI by MNEs.  In addition, an increase in the MNEs’ ability of technology transfer over
time will expand the volume of world trade, and in the continuum model it will cause
increasingly sophisticated goods to go through the product cycle.  If a way can be found
to ascertain the increase in the supply of resources that are essential to technology
transfer, then the above predictions can be empirically tested.
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If the South is small relative to the North, then the former gains from technology
transfer if the MNEs are sufficiently efficient in technology transfer; the large Northern
region always gains from quasi-rents.  If the South is large while the North is small,
then the former gains from productivity increases despite a deterioration in its terms of
trade.  If neither country is large relative to the other, both may gain but one of them
may lose due to deterioration in its terms of trade.
To address the issue of income distribution, it would be useful for future
research to allow for more than one factor of production.  In the present model, MNEs20
may or may not produce simultaneously in both countries, so a second direction of
future research is to consider vertically related production processes.
16
A third direction of research is to extend the technology transfer model to many
countries in order to capture the cascading pattern of FDI and trade, namely, that
advanced countries invest in all economies while Newly Industrializing Economies
invest in the developing economies.21
Footnotes
1. For some evidence about the lack of a strong positive correlation between total
capital flows and FDI flows, see Krugman (1998).  As reported by Blomstrom and
Kokko (1994), the main reason for FDI by Swedish firms has been technological
advantages. Swedish MNEs expanded FDI despite limitation on financing such
investment with funds raised in Sweden.
2. Bai, Tao and Wu (1999), in their study of 200 foreign joint ventures in China (whose
average size of investment is US$ 12 million), 95% of the foreign partners provide
patent, design, trademark and equipment, 56% provide technical training and 49%
provide technical and management support.
3. Helpman and Krugman (1985, chapters 12 and 13) have a similar analysis and arrive
at the same results.
4. If trade barriers and transportation costs are significant, MNEs may emerge
depending on the cost of technology transfer.  If such cost is relatively high, there will
be no technology transfer and no MNEs.
5. The four groups of transfer costs are (1) the cost of pre-engineering technological
exchanges; (2) the engineering costs associated with transferring the process design and
product design; (3) the cost of R&D personnel during all phases of the transfer project
for the purpose of solving unexpected transfer problems and adapting the technology,
and (4) pre-start-up training costs and learning and debugging costs during the start-up
phase.
6. According to Stewart and Nihei’s (1987, Table 6-1) study of Japanese subsidiaries
and joint ventures in Indonesia and Thailand, the Japanese expatriates accounted for 10-
75% of total professional and managerial employment, but only 0.5-3.0% of total
employment.
7. Similar assumptions are adopted in Cheng, Qiu and Tan (forthcoming).
8. An alternative assumption that Northern labor rather than Southern labor is used in
the process of technology transfer may be explored, but not done so here.
9. The expression of the average unit cost follows from the linear supply curve of T.
10. The deterioration of S’s terms of trade is equivalent to the effect of Hicks-neutral
technical progress in an economy’s exportable sector as analyzed by Findlay and
Grubert (1959).
11. If S is really large relative to the supply of T, then its local firms in both the22
manfactures and food industries co-exist with MNEs.  The unit costs after technology
transfer are the same as those before transfer, and the North’s comparative advantage
will not change.  We ignore this case because the implications are obvious: The South
gains nothing from technology transfer whereas the North exports manufactures and
provides technology transfer services to the South.
12. The case in which both (3) and (4) hold as equality implies that technology transfer
occurs in only one of the two industries.  These cases were analyzed above in Sections
4.1 and 4.2.
13. In DFS (1977), A is defined as a
*/a, but the inverse of this ratio is more convenient
for us.
14. A sufficient condition is that R(z) is increasing in z and R(0) < r < R(1).
15. Ekholm (forthcoming) analyzes the effect of trade in services associated with MNEs
on measures of revealed factor abundance, and Goldberg and Klein (1999) examine the
impact of FDI by MNEs on the pattern and volume of trade.  Unlike our Ricardian
models, however, Ekholm adopts the Heckscher-Ohlin model whereas Goldberg and
Klein adopt the specific-factor model as their respective analytical frameworks.
16. A partial equilibrium model developed by us (1998) featuring two kinds of labor
(skilled and unskilled) is used to explain vertical fragmentation of production between
Hong Kong and South China with and without FDI.23
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Appendix : An Analysis of the Continuum Model’s Equilibrium
To set the stage for the case of a flat supply curve of T, let us recall that without
technology transfer the balanced trade condition becomes
(1-z) (L+wL
*) = wL
*          (A1)
which yields a downward sloping locus in the (z,w) space, denoted by TB.  With no
technology transfer, the equilibrium is determined by TB and A(z), which is upward
sloping.
With technology transfer, A(z) is replaced by min [A(z),(1+rk(z))], and the locus
TB may be changed due to π M (it will be shown below that TB is governed by a
quadratic equation). The special case of a flat supply curve of T is analytically
convenient because when r = t0,  π M = 0 and the TB is identical to the case of no
technology transfer.  There are two possibilities: (i) ) ~ ( 0 z R t > , and (ii)  ) ~ ( 0 z R t < , where
z ~ is the “border good” in the model with no technology transfer.  If  ) ~ ( 0 z R t > , r is too
high to have any technology transfer.  For technology transfer to occur,  ) ~ ( 0 z R t <  and







As shown clearly in the above diagram, technology transfer has unambiguously
resulted in a range of products that go through the product cycle (i.e.,  ] , ~ [ 1 z z ) and
lowered the relative wage from w ~  to w
*.  A reduction in t0 will lower z0 and w
*, but raise
z1.  These results are summarized in the text as Proposition 5.
If the supply curve of T is upper sloping, then π M>0 and the position and shape
of the TB locus may be affected.  Let us return to this case by analyzing the properties
of the TB locus.
To derive the effect of r on the equilibrium z1 that satisfies the balanced trade
condition (equation (20) in the text), let us use w=1+rk(z1) to rewrite the condition as
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+ −  which can be further expressed as a quadratic
equation
(r - t0)
2 - 2α  (z1)(r - t0) - 2β (z1)=0,          (A2)
where α  (z1)=cL
* z1k(z1) /(1- z1), and β (z1)=cL
*z1 / (1- z1)+ t0  cL
* z1  k (z1)/(1- z1) - cL.
There exists  1 z defined by  0 ) ( 2 ) ( 1 1
2 = + z z β α  such that for all  1 1 z z > , there are two
solutions for (r – t0):
β α α 2 ) (
2
0 + + = − t r           (A3)
and (r – t0) = α   if  1 1 z z = .
Because an increase in z1 increases N’s wage income and the upper bound of the
integral in (equation (20) in the text), it follows that an increase in z1 shifts TD outward.












Hence, an increase in z1 leads to a larger equilibrium r. Thus, an upward sloping TT’
locus.
In the above diagram, it is assumed that the TT’ locus intersects the downward
sloping portion of the BT locus.  An increase in the supply of T in the sense of a
reduction in  0 t or c shifts TT’ downward and BT rightward. As a result, 
*
1 z increases
unambiguously, i.e., more advanced goods are produced by MNEs in H.  Even though
the effect on r cannot be determined by the movement of the two loci, r will be lower if
the system is stable in the sense that a change in the supply of T has a greater impact on
TT’ than on BT.  Since w = (1 +rk (z1)), the impact of an increase in the supply of T on
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Figure 2: Technology Transfer to Both  Industries
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Figure 4: Equilibrium in the market for T
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